Well, thank you very much, Mr. Delahunt, I appreciate

that.

I want to comment on a couple of things that have been said before,

and then ask a couple of questions.

First, the food assistance issue has been raised. There clearly is

a case of, all assistance of any kind is in a sense fungible and can

be used in other ways; but on the other hand, there is a distinction

between humanitarian aid and other more strategic articles. And

as a general proposition, I think the United States makes a great

error to cut off food assistance to almost any country, unless we are

in war. And I think we have been quite proper in our assistance

of food to North Korea. And we may well have to upgrade that

rather than retard that. And I do not think the United States Congress

should go on record against food assistance, I think it should

be the exact opposite.

Secondly, with some concern, I listened to one of your comments,

and I want to be very careful about this, Mr. Secretary. I believe

you set up a bit of a straw man argument. I know of no serious

commentator or observer of North Korea that favors solely bilateral

discussions, which is the way you phrased it. A number of us have

come to the conclusion that the Six-Party process, which has a lot

of advantages, should be complimented by more direct negotiations,

and that is a distinctly different flavor.

The advantage of the Six-Party process, as you have noted, is

that it involves other parties who have a terrific interest in the

issue, it also makes clear to the North Koreans that they are not

dealing with the United States exclusively, they are dealing with

the international community, which is largely united in opposition

to certain North Korean policies. But one of the disadvantages of

an exclusive Six-Party process is that, while it is true that our representative

can deal with their representative in Beijing, Mr. Hill

and Kim Jong-il, the disadvantage is we cannot deal at the decision-

making level with North Koreans.

And there is a—we have a professional diplomatic in the Six-

Party process of our own, they have, by their standards, a professional

diplomat, but not a decision-making individual.

In addition, there is an extraordinary psychological dimension to

this. I am often impressed that in international relations, as in personal

relations, there is a role of psychology, and we have taken a

position that we will only deal with them in the context of the Six-

Party process, although we will deal with them in a direct way at

these talks, but they have taken the position that they want to

meet with the United States. Given the fact that this is the most

isolated country, possibly, in the history of man, and certainly in

the modern world, I don’t understand how it is in the United

States’ national interest to keep them isolated from an American

representation in their capital.

And so my sense is, given where we are, that we should be willing

to put on the table, once they return to the Six-Party Talks,

once we receive the kind of commitments, vibrations, whatever

they might be, at these talks, that hopefully we will reconvene, as

you suggest, before the end of the year, we ought to weigh anew

whether or not we ought to respond in a direct way as well as within

the Six-Party Talks. And I think we can—there is no reason that

we can’t wait and review this.

But a number of aspects of this. When I was in North Korea with

Congressman Lantos 15 months or so ago, I really stressed the

model that I believed they ought to be looking at seriously, which

is the model of Vietnam, a country we were at war with 31⁄2 decades

ago—North Korea 51⁄2 or so decades ago—and that it is impressive

to me how far we have come in a direct way in dealing

with Vietnam. In fact, it is maybe the one country in the world

that has a substantially more improved relationship with the

United States in recent years, and that there is no reason whatsoever

that North Korea should not look at this Vietnamese model

very seriously. But an aspect of the Vietnamese model is the willingness

of the United States to deal directly with North Korea.

Now, there obviously may be timing aspects to this, but I think we

should be very careful not to make it psychological on our part to

refuse.

And I do not understand that dimension of the circumstance, and

whether it be meeting with significant North Korean figures in

Pyongyang, or possibly in the United States, I cannot think of anything

more likely to lead to a change in the psychology of the country.

And here, let me just conclude with an observation, that all of

us know so little about the decision making in North Korea, although

we certainly believe that it is closely held. But when one

travels in North Korea, one is certainly left with the impression

that there is very little analogy to Eastern Europe, that is, their

public is not pro-American, just as the government isn’t pro-American,

and in the Cold War era, Poles and Hungarians and Czechs

were incredibly pro-American, the government wasn’t. These people

aren’t.

And so it strikes me that our strategy should be aimed at the

people as well as the Government of North Korea. And we have a

non-government policy to the North Korean people, and that, to

me, is absolutely astonishing. And I think we should be thinking

very much in these terms.

The other aspect of this is, when you look at North Korea, it is

very clear that there are no social institutions like in Eastern Europe;

I mean, there is no Lech Walesa leading a labor movement,

no Vocklahavam leading an intellectual movement. The only alternative

to Kim Jong-il is the military. And I think strategies that

they perceive to be aimed at regime change are the exact type of

thing that may be counterproductive to the United States’ national

interest.

And so I think you deal with it by being as respectful as possible

to leadership, no matter how out of step it is and no matter how

out of sync it is with reality. And respect doesn’t have to go to policy,

but it can go to process. And one aspect of directly talking to

people is you have a respectful process.

And so I would only leave you—and I don’t need to search for responses

to theoretical questions because you point out pretty well

where the Administration stands, but with the notion that one of

the strengths the United States has in the world is a peculiar kind

of American openness, one of the strengths that we have underutilized

in recent times is an incredibly professional United States Department

of State. By chance, we have—or I shouldn’t say by

chance—by consideration, we have one of the truly fine diplomats

in America today, Secretary Hill, leading our delegation. Why we

shouldn’t utilize these strengths, I don’t completely understand.

Now what I do understand is that we don’t want to be put in the

position of North Korea suggesting that this is all North Korea

with issues vis-a-vis the United States or vis-a-vis the world. But

I don’t think direct talks slant as much in that direction as people

seem to think. And I hope when you say you are leaving a door

open—you very precisely in negotiations have said you are leaving

the door open to returning to the Six-Party Talks, and you are not

suggesting you are leaving the door open to direct talks. And I

would hope that there would be two doors, and that this country

can think anew about this circumstance, perhaps based upon some

forthcomingness that we are hoping for at the next round of the

talks.

Does that fit the State Department’s perspective, or is that in obverse

to it? Please.

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I appreciate that very much. And let me just conclude

by saying that, of all the issues between North Korea and the

United States, there appear to be misunderstandings, to me, the

largest is the counterfeiting issue. To this extent, no country should

countenance any other country where hoodlums in that country are

counterfeiting the currency of another country. And this is something

we have to take seriously as a people. And the Administration

is exactly correct in raising this issue in the manner it has.

Now hopefully it can be resolved, but there should be no misunderstanding

on the North’s part that the counterfeiting issue is

of fundamental significance. And in many circumstances it would

be considered an act of extraordinary national interest significance.

And so I want to strongly side with the Administration on this

issue.

In any regard, thank you for your testimony, Mr. Secretary. We

appreciate your public service, thank you. The Committee is adjourned.